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CASE NOTES
IN RE NAPSTER INC. COPYRIGHT LITIGATION:
DEFINING THE CONTOURS OF THE COPYRIGHT
MISUSE DOCTRINE
Scott A. Shert
I. INTRODUCTION
Napster, Inc. ("Napster"), in a ruling that marked its first
significant victory in a battle against the major companies in the
recording industry, persuaded Chief Judge Marilyn Hall Patel to
further consider whether the recording industry plaintiffs misused
their copyrights by attempting to control the digital distribution of
music.' If ultimately successful, Napster's copyright misuse defense
will bar the recording industry plaintiffs from asserting their
2
copyright infringement claims until they cease their illegal activity.
Napster's victory is significant for several reasons. First, and
practically, Judge Patel's order provides Napster with some breathing
room in this litigation that has condemned the company's music file-
swapping service 3 and effectively shut down its business for almost
t Scott is an attorney in the Palo Alto Office of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati,
P.C., where he focuses on antitrust and trade regulation matters, with a particular emphasis on
antitrust issues facing high-technology companies. This Case Note is intended for scholarly
discourse, educational use, and informational purposes only, and presents summaries of
particular developments in the law. It is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion. The views
expressed herein are the author's current, personal views, and should not be attributed to, and do
not necessarily represent the views of, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati or any of the Firm's
former, present, or future clients. Scott can be reached at SSher@wsgr.com.
1. See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *21
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002). The opinion also considered other issues, including whether
plaintiffs "owned" their copyrights.
2. See id. at * 16.
3. For a background of the case, see A&M Records Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL
227083 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001) (entry of modified preliminary injunction), aff'd No. 01-15998,
2002 WL 449550 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2002).
326 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYLA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
one year.4 Second, from a legal standpoint, Judge Patel's decision is
one of the first detailed discussions of the defense of copyright misuse
in the Ninth Circuit and provides copyright infringement defendants
with a significant arrow in their quiver of defenses against large, and
potentially monopolistic, plaintiffs seeking to "secure an exclusive
right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office." 5
Notwithstanding this victory, Napster still has a significant uphill
battle. Judge Patel's decision came in the context of a Rule 56(f)
6
motion for additional discovery. 7  While her decision effectively
grants Napster the opportunity to conduct discovery into whether the
recording industry plaintiffs misused their copyrights or committed
antitrust violations, the ruling, for all intents and purposes, has no true
legal adverse consequence for the plaintiffs. 8 Napster needed only to
demonstrate-and Judge Patel only concluded-that "there are
relevant facts remaining to be discovered ... that [may] raise an issue
of material fact." 9
Nevertheless, the opinion provides some useful guidance for the
parties and sets forth clearly the law of copyright misuse. In addition,
Judge Patel-who had to date reserved her harshest judgment for
Napster-drafted an opinion that "seems to signal a sea change in the
music industry's lawsuit against the peer-to-peer song-swapping
service."' 0  The recording industry, long under scrutiny for its
practices, which in the past have been deemed anticompetitive,' now
must defend itself against new charges of anticompetitive conduct and
4. See Kevin Featherly, Napster Case: Is Judge Turning Tables on Labels?,
NEWSBYTES, Feb. 1, 2002, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/02/174154.html.
5. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
6. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(0.
7. See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
8. See id at *3.
9. Id. (alteration added) (quoting Continental Mar. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades, 817 F.2d
1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987)).
10. Featherly, supra note 4.
11. The plaintiffs in this case have been through the antitrust ringer before, first with the
landmark price-fixing Supreme Court decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1
(1979). Plaintiffs also have been investigated for illegally fixing compact discs prices, see Press
Release, State of Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Music Distributors, Retailers
Charged with Price-Fixing (Aug. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.state.vt.us/atg/press08092000, and presently are under investigation by the
Department of Justice for the precise claims raised by Napster in this litigation-that they have
attempted to monopolize the digital distribution of music by unlawful means. See Jane Black,
Online Music: Cranking Up the Antitrust Volume, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 26, 2001,
available at http://www.businessweek.corribwdaily/dnflash/oct200l/nf200l1026_0654.htm.
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justify joint venture arrangements that Judge Patel concluded "look
bad, sound bad and smell bad."'12  Napster's new-found right to
conduct discovery into the recording industry's practices presents the
salacious opportunity for the underdog to knock the giant on its back.
This Case Note-much like Judge Patel's opinion-looks to the
history of the law of copyright misuse, the current state of the law,
and how the court preliminarily applied the law to the facts before it.
Finally, it discusses "what might be" if Napster's discovery ultimately
uncovers evidence of copyright misuse.
II. BACKGROUND
The Napster litigation began in December of 1999, when the five
major recording industry companies-BMG, Sony, EMI, Universal
and Warner-filed suit against Napster for copyright infringement.
1 3
Napster is a peer-to-peer file-swapping service; the Web site enabled
users from around the world to log in and trade music. This Internet
music-swapping function is referred to now in the industry as the
"digital distribution of music." 14 Plaintiffs contended that "Napster
knew of and failed to prevent its users' unauthorized reproduction and
distribution of plaintiffs' copyrighted sound recordings."' 5  Judge
Patel granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and shut
down the Napster file-swapping service until the company could
prevent such unauthorized reproduction.' 6 Napster appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, which subsequently affirmed.' 7 It is still shut down
today. 1
8
Napster's copyright misuse claims spring from the recording
industry plaintiffs' subsequent entry into the market for the digital
distribution of music. 19 In mid-2001, the major recording industry
companies formed two joint ventures-MusicNet and pressplay-that
enabled the digital distribution of their music. 20  MusicNet is a
collaboration between EMI, BMG, and Warner; pressplay is a venture
between Sony and Universal. 2' In June 2001, Napster signed a
12. In reNapster Copyright Litig., 2002 WL 482361, at *17.
13. See id. at *1.
14. See Featherly, supra note 4.
15. In re Napster Copyright Litig., 2002 WL 482361, at *l (citing Compl. 56-80).
16. See id.
17. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
18. See Featherly, supra note 4.
19. See In re Napster Copyright Litig., 2002 WL 482361, at *2-*3.
20. See id at *2.
21. See id
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licensing agreement with MusicNet, which allowed Napster to access
MusicNet's copyrighted materials, and will, when Napster comes
back on-line, allow Napster's customers to access this music content
as well.
22
Napster has challenged several provisions of the MusicNet
licensing agreement as an attempt by plaintiffs to unlawfully extend
their copyright.
III. THE STATE OF THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT MISUSE
Judge Patel first was confronted with the task of delineating the
contours of the copyright misuse defense.2 3 The copyright misuse
defense finds its origins in the law of patent misuse.24 Although the
doctrine has existed for some time, it has not been developed clearly
by the Ninth Circuit, and those courts that have confronted it squarely
have diverged in their interpretations and applications of the defense
and rarely have concluded that a defendant in a copyright
infringement case could assert it successfully. Moreover, there is a
clear-split of authority as to how to assert the defense. As will be
discussed below, several circuits allow a misuse defense to stand
where a defendant can demonstrate a violation of "public policy,"
whereas other courts require copyright misuse defendants to make a
showing that the plaintiff violated the antitrust laws by attempting to
extend its copyright.
One of the first cases to consider the copyright misuse defense,
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, set forth the rationale for the
defense in great detail.2 5 In Lasercomb, the court held that "a misuse
of copyright defense is inherent in the law of copyright just as a
misuse of patent defense is inherent in patent law., 26 Recognizing
"[t]he origins of patent and copyright law in England, the treatment of
these two aspects of intellectual property by the framers of our
Constitution, and the later statutory and judicial development of
patent and copyright law in this country persuade[d] [it] that parallel
public policies underlie the protection of both types of intellectual
22. See id. at *3.
23. Seeid. at*11.
24. See id.
25. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
26. Id. at 973.
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property rights, 27 the Fourth Circuit held that the doctrine of
copyright misuse existed as a defense to infringement actions. 8
Because the Lasercomb court relied on the doctrine of patent
misuse to ground its holding that the doctrine of copyright misuse
existed, it makes sense that a defendant asserting the copyright misuse
defense would have to make the same showing as would a patent
misuse defendant. In other words, as in a patent misuse claim, where
a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff attempted to extend its
copyright beyond its intended use, a copyright misuse claim would
stand: "[P]ublic policy ... forbids the use of the [copyright] to secure
an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright]
Office and which is contrary to public policy to grant.,
29
Thus, under Lasercomb, a defendant need not demonstrate that a
plaintiff violated the antitrust laws to successfully assert the copyright
misuse defense:
Both the presentation by appellants and the literature tend to
intermingle antitrust and misuse defenses. A patent or copyright is
often regarded as a limited monopoly-an exception to the general
public policy against restraints of trade. Since antitrust law is the
statutory embodiment of that public policy, there is an
understandable association of antitrust law with the misuse
defense. Certainly, an entity that uses its patent as the means of
violating antitrust law is subject of a misuse of patent defense.
However, Morton Salt held that it is not necessary to prove an
antitrust violation in order to successfully assert patent misuse.
30
The copyright misuse doctrine as defined by Lasercomb (i.e., a
defense that does not require a defendant to prove an antitrust
violation, but only to demonstrate a violation of "public policy") has
been expressly recognized by four circuits. 3 1 Several other circuits
have been more reluctant to adopt the defense, and instead have
adopted the doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement only
where the defendant can link the misuse to an actual antitrust
27. Id. at 974.
28. See id
29. Id. at 977.
30. Id. at 977-78 (citation omitted).
31. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice
Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 133 F.3d 1140
(9th Cir. 1998); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11 th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am.,
Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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violation.32 Finally, the First Circuit has left open the question as to
whether "the federal copyright law permits a misuse defense.,
33
Judge Patel had sufficient guidance from Ninth Circuit
precedents to conclude that the defense of copyright misuse existed.34
In Practice Management Information Corp. v. American Medical
Association, the plaintiff brought a suit for declaratory relief, arguing
that the defendant misused its copyright by negotiating a contract with
a federal agency (i.e., the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA)) in an anticompetitive manner. 35  In that case, the plaintiff
argued that the American Medical Association engaged in copyright
misuse by agreeing to license its product only if HCFA agreed not use
a competing diagnostic system. The Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding
that the provision clearly restrained trade (i.e., it precluded HCFA
from using competing products). As a result, the provision violated
public policy and was the basis for a copyright misuse defense.36
The Practice Management court, adopting the Fourth Circuit test
for copyright misuse, concluded that the defense "forbids the use of
the copyright to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not
granted by the Copyright Office." 37  The court, relying on the
Lasercomb decision, concluded that "a defendant in a copyright
infringement suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a
copyright misuse defense. 38  Instead, to prevail on the copyright
32. Presumably, such courts were concerned with allowing defendants to proceed with
misuse claims where they allege only vague and ambiguous "public policy" violations.
Requiring an actual antitrust violation provides clearer and more stringent guideposts for the
court and the parties. See Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191
(7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that the doctrine exists only when a defendant can demonstrate an
antitrust violation). In a subsequent case, the Seventh Circuit suggested, in qad. inc. v. ALN
Assocs., Inc., 974 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1992), that the copyright misuse doctrine may exist
separately and independently of a showing of an antitrust violation, but did not define its
contours. See also United Tel. Co. of Mo. v. Johnson Publ'g Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 604 (8th Cir.
1988) (same standard as set forth in the Seventh Circuit's Saturday Evening Post case).
33. Data Gen. Corp. v Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
34. See Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 520.
35. See id. at 520-22.
36. See id. at 522; see also Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977-79 (holding that license
agreement, which prohibited licensees from creating their own competing software program for
the ninety-nine-year term of the license, "essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the
licensee to independently implement the idea which [Lasercomb's software program]
expresses," and was invalid under the copyright misuse doctrine because it ran afoul of the
public policy surrounding the grant of a copyright).
37. Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977-79, and citing DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI
Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996)).
38. Id. (citing Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990)).
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misuse defense, a defendant need only demonstrate that "the
[plaintiff] used its copyright 'in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."'' 39  The court further
reasoned:
So while it is true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate
antitrust law probably would give rise to a misuse of copyright
defense, the converse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not be
a violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable
defense to an infringement action. The question is not whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law (such
as whether the licensing agreement is 'reasonable'), but whether
the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.
40
Practice Management is one of only a few cases in which a party
prevailed on a copyright misuse claim.
41
Judge Patel, however, correctly noted that even though Practice
Management held that it was unnecessary to demonstrate an antitrust
violation to raise the copyright misuse defense successfully, that court
"still rel[ied] on antitrust-like inquiries in determining what licensing
agreements violate public policy. Of the cases reviewed by the court,
all mimic the per se rules of antitrust., 4 2 Nonetheless, Judge Patel did
not need to decide whether Napster could rely on a violation of public
policy to support a copyright misuse claim. Instead, because Napster
argued in the alternative--contending both that plaintiffs committed
39. Id. at 521 (quoting Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 977).
40. Id.
41. In Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., 802 F. Supp.
1463 (N.D. Tex. 1992) ("EDS"), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant misused its software
copyrights in such a manner that restrained competition; imposed undue restrictions on the use
of copyrighted software that extended beyond the permissible bounds of the exclusive rights
granted by the copyright laws; and, unlawfully tied the purchase of its copyrighted software to
some other products or services. See EDS, 802 F. Supp. at 1465-66. The plaintiff brought suit,
seeking both damages and a declaration that the defendant's misuse of its copyrights rendered
the copyrights invalid and unenforceable. The defendant brought a motion to dismiss, arguing
that there is no cause of action for "misuse of copyright" and no legal basis for granting
affirmative relief based on such a theory. The EDS court denied the motion to dismiss,
concluding that the plaintiff stated a valid cause of action for damages and for declaratory relief.
The court suggested, however, that to succeed on a misuse of copyright claim in the affirmative,
the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the misuse of copyright actually violated the
antitrust laws. See id at 1466. Thus, it seems as though Napster would face a more rigorous
standard if it sought affirmative relief. This is the only case where a party sought affirmative
damages for copyright misuse and the court allowed it to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss
stage.
42. In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *13
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
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public policy violations and ran afoul of the antitrust laws-Judge
Patel left the issue for another day.
Napster argued two independent bases for the misuse defense.
First, it contended several of the terms of its licensing agreement with
MusicNet were unduly restrictive, and thus, contrary to public
policy. 43  Alternatively, Napster contended that even if the court
concluded the license agreements were not unduly restrictive, the
recording industry plaintiffs nonetheless could not enforce their
copyrights because their conduct was "so anti-competitive as to give
rise to a misuse defense.""
A. Copyright Misuse Based on a Public Policy Violation
Napster first contended that the MusicNet licensing agreement
was unduly restrictive and thus in violation of public policy.
45
Although the court did not decide the issue on its merits, Judge Patel
strongly suggested that she was concerned about several of the
apparently oppressive terms in the agreement. Therefore, she allowed
Napster the opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue.46
Specifically, Napster alleged that the MusicNet agreement
effectively prevented Napster from ever entering into a license
agreement with a non-MusicNet member.47 First, the licensing
agreement had a limited period of absolute exclusivity (through
March 2002). 4 More important, Napster challenged section 19.1 of
the Agreement, which provided that Napster could enter into a
licensing agreement with a non-MusicNet distributor (e.g., Sony or
Universal) only through MusicNet itself.49 Thus, if Napster wished to
enter into a license agreement with Sony to use Sony's copyrighted
music, it could only do so if MusicNet secured the license from
Sony.5° If MusicNet could not secure that license, Napster would be
out of luck. Moreover, the MusicNet agreement provided that if
Napster did attempt to enter into such an individual license with a
non-MusicNet company, MusicNet could "terminate the agreement
43. See id. at*14.
44. Id.
45. Seeid. at *14-*16.
46. Seeid. at*21.
47. Seeid. at*14-*15.
48. See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *14
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
49. See id.
50. See id.
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with ninety-day notice. 51  Alternatively, MusicNet could charge
Napster higher fees if it failed "to use MusicNet as its exclusive
licensor for content.,
52
Facially, this provision is very problematic. Plaintiffs asserted
that they anticipated reaching agreements with the other two non-
MusicNet distributors-Sony and Universal. Having reached such
agreements, they argued, Napster would be able to obtain licensing
agreements through any major distributor, and consequently, there
was no harm in requiring Napster to "ask permission from
MusicNet., 53 Notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments, Napster has a
strong basis to contend that this provision unduly extends plaintiffs'
valid copyrights.
As Judge Patel noted, "[t]he critical issue is that the agreement
binds Napster to obtain licenses from MusicNet and not its
competitors." 54 Section 19.1 seems to extend plaintiffs' copyrights
beyond their original purpose. Those copyrights did not confer upon
plaintiffs the right to foreclose Napster from entering into other
licensing arrangements with other music companies. Given that the
MusicNet companies do not control all music content, the agreement
effectively could foreclose Napster from a significant portion of
commercially available music (i.e., that content from non-MusicNet
distributors). Additionally, the agreement seems rather unseemly, as
it allows MusicNet to be the ultimate arbiter of whether Napster could
freely negotiate with non-MusicNet distributors of on-line music.
Plaintiffs made several arguments to support their position that
Napster could not rely on the copyright misuse defense. First, they
contended that MusicNet was an entity separate from plaintiffs, and
as a result, plaintiffs were not responsible for the actions of the joint
venture. 55 Although the court ultimately did not rule on this issue,
Judge Patel suggested strongly that this argument was meritless,
stating that "plaintiffs cannot hide behind the shell of a joint venture
to protect themselves from misuse claims. The court views with great
suspicion plaintiffs' claims of ignorance as to MusicNet's activities.
Surely the three parties to MusicNet discussed their joint venture
before entering into it."
'56
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Seeid. at*14-*15.
54. In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *15
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
55. See id. at *15-*16.
56. Idat*15.
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Plaintiffs also contended that even if they had engaged in
copyright misuse, that should not excuse Napster's infringement. The
alleged misuse, according to plaintiffs, did not occur during the time
frame when the infringement occurred, and thus should not act as a
bar to plaintiffs' suit.57 Again, the court rejected that claim, noting
that the doctrine of copyright misuse "does not prevent plaintiffs from
ultimately recovering for acts of infringement that occur during the
period of misuse. The issue focuses on when plaintiffs can bring or
pursue an action for infringement," and plaintiffs cannot claim
infringement while they are misusing their copyrights.5 8  In other
words, plaintiffs first would have to cure the offending licensing
provisions before they could pursue their infringement claim.
B. Copyright Misuse Predicated on an Antitrust Violation
Alternatively, Napster claimed that even if section 19.1 of the
MusicNet agreement did not violate public policy, plaintiffs' antitrust
violations were sufficient to support Napster's copyright misuse
defense. 59 Specifically, Napster alleged that the MusicNet agreement
was anticompetitive and facilitated collusion. 60  Concluding that
MusicNet and other agreements between plaintiffs "look bad, sound
bad and smell bad," Judge Patel allowed Napster to conduct discovery
to determine whether plaintiffs-through MusicNet and pressplay-
engaged in horizontal price fixing, retail price squeezing, a refusal to
deal, and exclusive dealing.
6 1
Because the record was largely undeveloped at the time, Judge
Patel only cursorily discussed Napster's antitrust claims.62 However,
Judge Patel noted that plaintiffs had failed to present any evidence
that their MusicNet joint venture had any procedural protections in
place to limit or preclude the possibility of price fixing.6 3 According
to the court: "[E]ven a naff must realize that in forming and operating
a joint venture, plaintiffs' representatives must necessarily meet and
discuss pricing and licensing, raising the specter of possible antitrust
57. Seeid at*16.
58. Id. (Judge Patel quoted Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 n.22
(4th Cir. 1990): "Lasercomb is free to bring suit for infringement once it has purged itself of the
misuse.").
59. See id.
60. See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at * 16-
*18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
61. Id. at *17.
62. See id. at *16-*18.
63. See id. at * 18.
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violations." 64  Napster was entitled to discovery, according to the
court, to determine whether plaintiffs had in place any of the proper
protections to ensure that the parties to the joint ventures did not
engage in any illegal activity.6 5
C. Plaintiffs' Unclean Hands Argument
Because copyright misuse is an equitable doctrine, plaintiffs
contended that a party with "unclean hands" like Napster cannot avail
itself of the defense.66 The court preliminarily disagreed.6 7
Like the law of copyright misuse itself, the contours of the
unclean hands doctrine in a copyright misuse case also are unclear.
Judge Patel noted that one Federal Circuit opinion interpreting Ninth
Circuit law, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,
recognized in passing that the "doctrine of unclean hands can...
preclude the defense of copyright misuse. 68 However, Judge Patel
also noted that the Atari decision did little to explain why the doctrine
of unclean hands bars a misuse defense, and several other courts
persuasively had reached the opposite conclusion. 69 Judge Patel thus
preliminarily disregarded the Atari holding.
Instead, Judge Patel was persuaded by the Fifth Circuit decision
in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.70 In Alcatel, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the doctrine of unclean hands was not
generally available to serve as a bar to the copyright misuse defense.7'
Where "plaintiffs seek equitable relief ... then the defendant's
improper behavior serves as no bar to its equitable defenses. 72 On
the other hand, if the plaintiff seeks only legal relief, "the defendant's
unclean hands may preclude it from advancing equitable defenses. 73
This distinction makes sense. According to Judge Patel,
64. Id. at *17.
65. See id. at *21.
66. See In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *18-
*21 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002).
67. See id. at *21.
68. Id. at * 18 (quoting Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 846
(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
69. See id. at * 19.
70. See id. (citing Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999)).
71. See id. (citing Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 794 n.92).
72. In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., No. MDL 00-1369, 2002 WL 482361, at *19
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2002) (quoting Alcatel, 166 F.3d at 794 n.92).
73. Id.
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[p]laintiffs used this court's open doors to obtain an injunction that
eventually forced Napster to disable file-sharing entirely. Because
plaintiffs have invoked this court's equitable powers (and it now
appears that plaintiffs may have since sullied their hands with
misuse), Napster should be entitled to assert equitable defenses.
Once plaintiffs used equity as a sword to prevent Napster's
continued infringement, they lost the right to employ the unclean
hands bar to shield themselves from the consequences of their own
potentially inequitable behavior.
7 4
In addition, Judge Patel reasoned that the copyright misuse
defense is meant to protect not only the private party asserting it, but
also the public itself. Thus, "[i]n the interests of right and justice the
court should not automatically condone the defendant's infractions
because plaintiff is also blameworthy, thereby leaving two wrongs
unremedied and increasing the injury to the public. 7 5 Judge Patel
clearly was concerned about the harm that the seemingly troublesome
conduct of the recording industry plaintiffs could do to competition
and consumers; as a result, the court did not want Napster's
misconduct to serve as a shield to allow the recording industry to
harm consumers through agreements or collaborate activity that ran
afoul of either the antitrust laws or public policy.76 In the end, Judge
Patel allowed Napster to conduct additional discovery because, if
Napster's allegations find support in the facts, "plaintiffs are
attempting the near monopolization of the digital distribution
market.,
77
Thus, it appears that the battleground has shifted. This ruling
from Judge Patel does put the recording industry on the defensive for
the time being and creates a strong incentive for the plaintiffs to
consider settlement. With a Justice Department inquiry looming, the
recording industry has every reason to avoid a lengthy private
investigation into its potentially anticompetitive practices.
IV. NAPSTER'S PROSPECTS GOING FORWARD
Going forward, Judge Patel does not have significant guidance as
to whether the plaintiffs' actions rise to the level of copyright misuse.
There are simply no cases with facts similar to those presented in the
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id. at *19 (quoting Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349-
50 (9th Cir. 1963)).
76. See id at *20.
77. Id.
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Napster litigation. It is important to note that in all of the cases where
a defendant successfully asserted the defense of copyright misuse, the
license provision at issue drastically increased the scope of the
copyright beyond that which was granted by the copyright originally.
Thus, the issue for the court will be whether section 19.1 of the
MusicNet agreement substantially extended the plaintiffs' valid
copyrights. Napster must persuade Judge Patel that plaintiffs are
using their copyrights to curtail competition. It will be important for
Napster to demonstrate both that the duration and breadth of the
agreement are excessive.
In this area, precedents are thin, but will nonetheless help guide
the court's decision. Defendants have successfully asserted the
defense only in a few instances, including those in which:
* The license restricted the licensee's ability to develop similar
software, for ninety-nine years, whether or not the similar
software was developed using the licensed technology (e.g.,
reverse engineered), or developed independently; 78
* The license restricted the licensee's ability to use competing
products for the duration of the license; and
79
* The license absolutely restricted the licensee's ability to
develop products to compete with the licensor's uncopyrighted
products that were related to the copyrighted licensed
products.80
On the other hand, courts have rejected the copyright misuse
defense in the following instances:
* The license prohibited the licensee from developing a product
that competed with the licensed product where the licensee
attempted to develop that product using reverse engineering
(reasoning that it is acceptable to limit a licensee's ability to
develop a competing product by copying the licensor's
design);81
* The licensee had "unclean hands," thus prohibiting it from
being able to raise the copyright misuse defense, which the
court characterized as an equitable defense. The licensee had
78. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
79. See Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
80. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
81. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
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lied to the Copyright Office to obtain licensor's copyrighted
material;
82
The license prohibited, in perpetuity, use of certain licensed
intellectual property to make a product that would compete
with the licensed product. The court distinguished Lasercomb,
which not only prohibited in perpetuity the development of a
product based on knowledge learned from license, but also the
independent development of a product that competed with the
licensed product.8 3
Given precedent, Napster will have a difficult battle ahead,
although not an impossible one. The MusicNet license is not
exclusive for a significant duration and does not prohibit Napster
from entering into license agreements with competing ventures, both
facts that undermine Napster's misuse claim. However, several of the
provisions of the MusicNet agreement do seem excessive, including
the section that requires Napster to secure (through MusicNet only)
other license agreements for digitally distributed music. This
provision effectively requires Napster to seek permission from
MusicNet to enter into competing distribution agreements. The
agreement also grants MusicNet the right to terminate the agreement
if Napster does sign up with a competing recording industry
company. Finally, the agreement allows MusicNet to raise its fees if
Napster enters into an arrangement with a competing company.
Judge Patel likely will find this to be a defacto exclusive arrangement
because its terms severely punish Napster if it attempts to enter into
competitive agreements. Additionally, the agreement requires
Napster to make a decision it should not have to make: to sign the
agreement and give MusicNet the ability to dictate to Napster with
whom the Company can obtain additional agreements for on-line
music content, or not to sign the agreement and lose access to the
music content owned by the MusicNet joint venture partners.
Whether Napster will prevail clearly is an issue that requires
additional discovery.
Napster's discovery likely will also yield significant evidence
regarding the MusicNet and pressplay joint ventures. It will be
interesting to see whether this discovery yields evidence that the
parties-competitors in the music industry-have designed their joint
ventures to adequately protect against antitrust risk. Although courts
82. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(applying Ninth Circuit law).
83. See Syncsort Inc. v. Sequential Software, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 1999).
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and the government recognize that competitor collaborations "often
are not only benign but procompetitive," such collaborations must
take special care to protect against certain pitfalls. 84  Specifically,
Napster's discovery should answer the following:
" Is the MusicNet venture open to all recording industry
participants? If it is not, the court may conclude this is a
boycott.
" How restrictive is the venture? Does it repress alternative
distribution channels? If it does, the court may conclude the
venture unduly restrains competition.86
" Does the venture facilitate improper information exchange?
Do the participants have access to competitively sensitive
information such as pricing, customer lists, volume of sales, or
discounts? Have the participants set up firewalls and taken
other steps to limit the flow of such information? If the
ventures' firewalls are porous, this would suggest, at a
minimum, that the recording industry competitors/plaintiffs
improperly share sensitive information, providing evidence of
collusion in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act.
87
In the end, the plaintiffs may decide that it is in their best interest
to settle this litigation, rather than to risk exposure associated with
such sensitive discovery. With a pending investigation from the
Department of Justice, plaintiffs have every incentive to close off one
potential battlefront. Nevertheless, even if this litigation settles,
Judge Patel's opinion provides a good legal framework as to how to
analyze copyright misuse claims, and clearly sets forth the important
84. FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (Apr. 2000) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,160 at 20,851-52 (2000) and available at
http://www.flc.gov/os/200O/O4/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
85. Compare Bascom Food Prods. Corp. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 616,
632 (D.N.J. 1989) (granting preliminary injunction because there was sufficient evidence to
establish that there was a horizontal group boycott and that plaintiffs would be unable to
compete in the relevant market without access to defendants' products) with United States v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (agreement among motion
picture companies forming pay television network joint venture to make movies available to the
venture nine months before making them available to competing networks held facially
unreasonable).
86. See GUIDELINES, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. at 20,861 ("In general, competitive concern is
likely to be reduced to the extent that participants actually have continued to compete, either
through separate, independent operations or through membership in other collaborations, or are
permitted to do so.").
87. See id. at 20,853.
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unanswered questions that the Ninth Circuit must one day finally
confront.
